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Abstract
The paper’s aim is to link two different issues: equalization and fiscal competition.
In the model there are two regions: the first one has rich citizens and the other one
has poor citizens. Regional representatives in a federal Council must decide on the
introduction of an equalization transfer based on fiscal capacity. Regions choose
tax rates on a consumption good and the citizens choose where to buy the
consumption good. We show that the existence of the transfer stimulates regions to
choose higher tax rates. The economic insight for this result is that the existence of
a mobile tax base generates a negative fiscal externality on each regional planner.
We show that the equalization transfer presents a wider range of agreement
opportunities between regional representatives to correct the inefficient levels of
tax rates than a compensation transfer does. This is because efficiency gains are
equalized with the introduction of an equalization transfer
JEL classification: H21, H23.
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20. Introduction
Fiscal decentralization is normally justified by two factors. Firstly, local
taxes reflect citizens' preferences much more than central taxes. Secondly, the
management of local public expenditure would be more efficient than it
would be if taxes were centralized.
However, in a Federation the geographical subset, where regional
Government taxes, can not coincide with the subset where the tax-base of the
residents of each region is distributed. In this case with free mobility of
persons, goods and capital each region fixes its tax rate without taking into
account the benefits in revenue and/or social welfare to the other regions
(Mintz and Tulkens 1986; Wilson, 1991; Wildasin, 1988, 1991). That
generates fiscal externalities. The extent and direction of these externalities
depends on the interaction of two effects: public consumption effect and
private consumption effect. The first effect is due to the region raising its tax-
rate, which, if its tax-base is mobile, will benefit the other regions in revenue
terms: in this way the region will fix a too-low tax-rate from a federal point of
view. The second effect comes out only if the region is exporting the taxed
good. In this case the region does not take into account that the good is also
consumed by the citizens of the other regions and will fix a too-high tax-rate
from a federal point of view.
I wish to thank Flavia Ambrosanio, Giampaolo Arachi, Massimo Bordignon, Umberto
Galmarini, Piero Giarda, and Federico Revelli  and participants to the EOPP seminar at LSE
and to the seminar at University of Ferrara for helpful comments.
3In the EC fiscal competition is a concrete issue if we think of taxes like
VAT or excises on fuel and alcohol. With taxation not co-ordinated the risk
of cross-border shopping becomes real. In the 80’s we experienced cases of
cross-border shopping: Denmark-Germany and Ireland-United Kingdom
(Fitzgerald et alii 1988, 1995). In  ‘84  Ireland was forced to lower taxes on
whiskey and TV because of the huge cross-border shopping of its residents in
Northern Ireland. Cross-border shopping is also recently becoming a problem
for the United Kingdom with Europe for products like wine and beer which
are taxed vmuch more in UK than in the continental states (Crawford, Tanner,
1995).
According to the above mentioned empirical studies, that fiscal
competition stimulates regions to lower equilibrium tax-rates, has a
theoretical explanation: regions in their objective function give high weight to
the collected revenue and the public consumption effect prevails.
Normally States or regions make some co-operative agreements to
define tax-bases or tax-rates or to share taxes with the federal government. In
this latter case the way that the federal revenue is given back can be crucial to
the extent of fiscal externalities or the fairness level in the public good
provision among different regions.
In this paper we analyse whether a transfer whose task is to equalize
differences in the provision of local public goods can modify inefficiencies
stemming from fiscal competition. This situation is to be considered with
4these transfers reducing the higher revenue that  regions get by attracting tax-
base and by compensating other regions, which are losing tax-base. It is the
case when the equalization transfer can transfer back a quota of the migrated
tax-base.
Empirical literature (Bird and Slack, 1990; Bird, 1993) on equalization
transfer does not take into account the influence in the introduction of
equalization transfers on the fiscal decisions of the regions. In our work we
try to study these effects in a framework with asymmetric per-capita tax-bases
and with revenue maximiser regions.
We study the determinants of unanimous agreements on the
introduction of an equalization system by the regions. In a context, where a
federating process is starting up, as in the European Community or Italy, this
issue is crucial. Can the equalization system come out of an agreement among
the members of the Federal State?
We deal with this problem in a model with two regions where demand
levels of the residents in the two regions are different. So per-capita tax-bases
are asymmetric. The model is an extension of the Kanbur and Keen (1993)
one. In the Kanbur and Keen (1993) model asymmetry was due to difference
in sizes. In the model total tax-bases, but not per-capita ones, are asymmetric.
The peculiarity of our model is the difference in per-capita tax-bases, which is
of course very relevant in the evaluation of the effects of an equalization
system. In the model the regions maximise revenue by choosing tax rates and
a federal Council decides whether to introduce or not an equalization system.
5We can think of an institutional framework like the one of the European
Community where the Commission could propose the structure of the
equalization system, but after the Council should approve it. We explore the
possibility linked to the difference in per-capita tax-base that the choice of the
federal Council brings a Pareto improvement in the level of the federal
collected revenue. We show how an equalization transfer has greater
possibilities to be introduced with the consensus of both regions than a
compensation transfer does, given that both transfers introduce some kind of
inefficiency in the revenue collection.
The paper is organised as follows. In the first section we describe the
model . In the second section we explain and comment on the solution of the
model. We explore the possible equilibria with equalization. In the third
section we consider the possibility that the federal Council chooses a
compensation transfer and we compare the two  transfers.
1. Description of the model
There are two regions, 1 and 2. In each region there are  consum rs
uniformly distributed.
There are two firms, one in each region, with identical constant return
to scale technology, which uses labour as input. Each firm produces the same
homogeneous consumption good y. Pr uction prices in this case are fixed.
We make the hypothesis that the demand of the consumption good, y1,
of each resident in region 1 is lower than the demand, y2 , of each resident in
6region 2. These are goods for which it is difficult to find substitutes so if
people are used to consume a certain quantity they will not change their
demand much even if prices change. We take account of this characteristic of
the good by making the simplifying assumption that demands are rigid with
respect to the prices. The reservation prices of the consumers of the two
regions are such that the new tax-rate equilibrium, after the introduction of
the transfer, will not induce a change in demand with respect to the no-
equalization case. From now on we will refer to region 1 as the poor region
and region 2 as the rich region.
In each region there is a leviathan government which maximises its
revenue by choosing tax on the consumption good y. This assumption on the
objective function will cause a public consumption effect which will
stimulate too-low Nash equilibrium tax-rates with respect to the federal
optimal solution (Mintz, Tulkens, 1986).
A Council composed of the representatives of the regions decides on
the introduction of an equalization transfer based on difference between per-
capita tax-bases. The decisions of the Council are taken at unanimity. This is
the same rule of the EC Council when it has to approve fiscal acts.  So the
Council accepts to introduce the equalization transfer if it is Pareto-
improving.
The model consists of a three stage complete information game. We
solve it by backwards induction.
7At the first stage, the Council, composed of the representatives of the
two regions, decides on the introduction of an equalization transfer.
The introduction of the equalization transfer is likely to stimulate moral
hazard problems in both regions. The transfer assures the poor region that it
will receive a revenue quota from the other region, which can stimulate the
poor region to decrease its effort in the control and development of its tax-
base. The rich region will also have less incentive to control its tax-base
because a quota of its revenue will go to the other region. Another example
can be that when the states have to inform a federal organism with data about
their tax-base. The states have incentives to provide biased information to get
(give) the highest (lowest) amount of revenue. This can behaviour can induce
the states to expect a loss in revenue after the introduction of the transfer.
We do not model the asymmetric information problem (Bo dignon et
alii, 1996), but we take account of the consequences on the collected revenues
of the behaviour of the regional governments. We make the assumption that
the introduction of an equalization transfer stimulates a loss in revenue which
is a linear positive function of the equalization level a. The higher the level of
the transfer is, the higher the disincentive to control the tax-base or the higher
the risk to lose revenue because the other states are providing false
information.
 At the second stage, regional governments maximise revenue by
choosing tax rates.
8At the third stage each consumer decides where to buy the good
knowing that crossing the border implies a cost d per uni of distance from the
border.
2. The model
The model is solved by backwards induction. At the third stage we
determine tax-base flow from one region to another. At the second stage
regions choose tax-rates by maximising tax-bases. At the first stage, once we
have the equilibrium tax-rates we can calculate equilibrium revenues. The
representatives of the regions choose whether to introduce or not the transfer
by comparing the revenue functions they would have with the transfer with
those without the transfer.
2.1 The third stage
Take region 2. Two conditions must be satisfied for the consumer of
region 2 to cross the border and buy the good in region 1. The first one is that
the surplus the consumer obtains by buying the same quantity she is ready to
buy in her region is higher than the surplus the same consumer would get in
her region:
Insert fig. 1
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9The second condition asks for non-negative surplus:
(2) 02122 >-- dysyr d .
1r , 2r  reservation price net of production cost, in region 1 and 2, at which
the consumer is indifferent between buying ymor ym -1 units of the good
where m=1,2;
d transport cost per unit of distance to the border;
d  distance from the border of the consumer indifferent as to whether he is
to buy in region 1 or in region 2. As consumers are uniformly distributed d
indicates also the consumers’ quota going from region 2 to region 1.
s s1 2 and   are per-unit tax of the two regions on the good y.
2.2 Second stage
The total demand function of good y of each region for a given tax-rate
of the other region is:
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Total consumption demands are very similar to the ones of the Ka bur
and Keen model. If in our model we substitute the demand value with the size
value of the regions  (in the Kanbur and Keen model regions differ for their
size) and vice versa for the size we fall into the Kanbur and Keen case. Total
regional tax-bases are still the same, but per-capita regional tax-bases differ
from our model: they are the same in both regions in the Ka bur and Keen
model.
2.2.1 An equalization transfer
The solution of the following equation:
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where:
B1 tax-base of region 1
B2 tax-base of region 2
n residents in each region
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a  equalization rate
tr2 is the transfer that region 2 will receive or give to equalize a quota  of
per-capita tax-bases.
Symmetrically one can obtain tr1. The total equalization transfer from
one region to the other is:1
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If we substitute in (5) (3a) and (4b), or (3b) and (4a) we get the
expression for the transfer from one region to the other which equalizes per-
capita revenue at the equalization rate a:
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Take the case s1 2£ . The transfer is composed of two terms. The first
one, ( )± -an y y1
2 1 2
, is the revenue per-capita equalization at a rate a in the
case of closed frontiers.
                                                 
1There is a similar transfer in Canada: the RTS (see Bird, 1990). It is of course more
complicated because of the existence of more than two regions and the equalization rate is
normally a weighted average of the average tax rates of all the regions.
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With open frontiers and s s1 2< , there is a consumers’ quota going from
region 2 to region 1. This phenomenon makes the rich region have a lower
tax-base than it would have in the autarkic case. The reverse is true for the
poor region. In fact in (6a) we have the term ±
-
a
d
n
s s
y2 1 2, which is
positive for the rich region and negative for the poor one. This term is the
transfer to the rich region of a a-quota of the tax-base migrated to the poor
region.
In the Kanbur and Keen model the only reason for the difference in the
equilibrium tax-bases is cross-border shopping. In their model, where per-
capita tax-bases are the same, the equalization transfer is:
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where:
n1 consumers of region 1
n2 consumers of region 2
It is of course proper to think of different per-capita tax-bases if we do
not want to lose the redistributive impact of a transfer, which equalizes per-
capita tax-bases.
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2.2.2 Best reply functions and the equilibrium
The introduction of an equalizing can cause a loss in revenue. We
discussed the reasons of this loss in section 1.  We express the loss as a linear
function of the equalization rate:
ka.
The higher k is, the higher the loss for each level of a is. Thus k
measures the level of inefficiency due to the existence of the transfer.
(7)
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region 1 maximises (7) with respect to s1 and region 2 maximises (8) with
respect to s2. The best reply functions are (see appendix A2 and fig.2):
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Insert fig.2
In (9) we see how region 1, that has a lower per-capita tax-base,
chooses a tax-rate higher than the one of region 2 for very low s2 levels.
Region 2’s tax-rate is so low that it is not worth it for region 1 to lower its
tax-rate in order not to allow its residents to migrate. If region 2’s tax-rate
rises, region 1 raises its tax-rate of one half. Its tax-rate will stay in the regime
s s1 2>  until some s1 level. This level is lower the higher the difference in per-
capita tax-bases is and the lower transport cost is. At this s1 level a marginal
rise in s2 will cause region 1 to undercut s1, reversing the cross-border
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shopping direction. The higher the per-capita tax-base difference between the
two regions, the lower region 2’s tax-base with respect to region 1’s tax-base
and of course the lower the s1 level at which region 2 undercuts.
In (10) where we consider the best reply function of region 2, the region
raises its tax-rate, when the other region will raise its too, without ever
undercutting. Difference in per-capita tax-base never makes a jump in the
best reply function worth it.
If we combine (9) and (10) we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 1: If l £ 1 and  [ ] ad +³21,min rr  then a unique Nash
equilibrium exists in pure strategies:
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1
3
2
3
* = +
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷+d l a
s2
2
3
1
3
* = +
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷+d l a
Proof: see appendix A2.
The poor region chooses a lower tax-rate than the one the rich region
chooses. s s1 2=  cannot in fact be an equilibrium because region 1’s tax-base
elasticity is lower than region 2’s. Suppose that s2 is t e equilibrium tax-rate
of region 2 then s s1 2=  cannot be a Nash equilibrium. In this case in fact a
change of s2 gives 0 marginal rise in revenue, but, as in s s1 2=  region 2’s tax-
base is lower than region 1’s tax-base (ny ny1 2< ), if region 1 decreases its
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tax-rate the tax-base migrating to region 1 is higher than the migration of tax-
base from 1 to 2, given 2’s tax-rate. Indeed decrease of s1 lead  to a rise in the
revenue of region 1. This is the reason why Nash equilibrium tax-rates are
such that s s1 2< . This result is due to Kanbur and Keen (1993). In their
model the asymmetry in population size of the two regions determines the
difference in the elasticity of the total tax-bases we have illustrated. Even if
we have an asymmetry in the level of per-capita consumption, as in our case,
the total tax-bases are the same as the ones of the Kanbur and Keen model if
we exchange per-capita consumption with size. That explains why our model
replicates the Kanbur and Keen result. What is important is the asymmetry in
the total tax-bases.
2.3 The equalization effect on the fiscal externality
What is new in the model is the introduction of an equalization transfer
stimulates higher tax rates. The regional planner raises its tax-rate because the
equalization transfer is composed of a part implying a limitation of the effect
of mobility. A quota of the mobile tax-base will “come back”. The regional
planner will take this part into account in choosing tax-rates.
To better understand what happens let us examine the first order
conditions of the federal government whose welfare function is:
),(),( 212211 ssRssRW +=
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and evaluate them at the Nash equilibrium:
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Each region does not take into account that a raise in its tax rate, given the
tax rate of the other, will benefit the other region, so tax rates are lower than
the efficient ones are. (11) and (12) are exactly the analytical expressions of
the fiscal externalities.
The first order conditions related to the Nash equilibrium are the following
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In (13) the fiscal externality effect on the decision of Region 1 is given
by 
d
2
1
y
s- , which in equilibriun is exactly the value, with opposit sign, we
have found in (11). The equalizing transfer effect is given by
d
a 2
y
. This
effect can reduce or eliminate the fiscal externality effect. Each region in this
case takes account that a raise in its tax-rate, given the tax-rate of the other
18
region, will benefit the other region, because it will get this benefit through
the equalizing mechanism.
2.4 Some descriptive evidence
It is interesting to compare two federal countries like Canada and Australia
with two different distribution of taxing power.
If we look in the Statistics on tax revenues (OECD, 1996) at the item taxes
on production and sales (which essentially includes sales taxes, VAT taxes
and excises taxes) we can observe the following:
Percentage collected at State/Provincial level
Canada 51
Australia 14
which tells us that Canada has a much more decentralized taxing power than
Australia. According to the theory we would expect Australia to raise more
revenue than Canada because Australia should have lower fiscal externalities,
but if we look at the tax revenue of the federation, relative to p oduction and
sales, as percentage of total tax revenue of the federation, we get:
Canada 30
Australia 23
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In this result general taxes (sales and VAT taxes) are determinant.
Even if in Canada taxes on production and sales are much more
decentralised, Canada is able to raise a higher quota of total revenue than
Australia does.
This can be due to agreements among provinces. But it is not easy to reach
them: only recently Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and NewBrunswick reached
an agreement on a harmonised sales tax (1997). The other provinces still
autonomously decide their retail sales tax.
The low harmful impact of fiscal competition could be explained by the
existence of a transparent equalizing system based on differences on tax-
bases, like the Canadian system, which is very similar to the transfer we
adopted in the model. In Canada the transfer is calculated for 33 types of
taxes. (some of them are: sales taxes, taxes on tobacco, wine, beer, fuel).
2.5 First stage
At the first stage the federal Council decides whether to introduce or
not the transfer at unanimity. So given the absence of an equalization transfer
we want to explore the determinants of the possibility of introducing an
equalization transfer  which  Pareto-improves the revenue of the Federation.
2.5.1 The equalization transfer
If we substitute in (7) and (8) equilibrium tax rates, we get:
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If we subtract from (15) and (16) the revenue raised by the regions without
the equalizing transfer, we obtain ÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -
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ka
2
21 yy . Region 1 and 2 with the
introduction of the equalising system gain 
2
21 yy +a  and lose ka . Both
regions have the same efficiency gain because of equalization.
Both regions will not agree on the introduction of the equalization
transfer if
2
21 yy +³k  . In this case the inefficiency due to the introduction
of the transfer is not compensated by the efficiency gain, due to the effect that
the transfer have on the fiscal externalities.
3. The compensation transfer
In this section we assume that the Federal Council wants just to avoid
fiscal inefficiency due to mobility. The Council has to decide on the
introduction of a transfer, which compensates the loss in revenue of the
higher tax-rate region because of migration. We assume that also in this case
the introduction of the transfer causes a loss in revenue due to the reasons
21
outlined in section 1. So each region will lose revenue in the same way as
before.
In our model such a compensation transfer is:
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  is the demand quota going from region 1 to region 2.
Introducing (17) limits mobility effect on the tax-rate.
We want to explore the possibility that also the introduction of the
compensation transfer can Pareto-improve the Federal revenue.
If we set a=b, (17) is the second part of the equalization transfer (6).
The compensation transfer is equivalent to the equalization transfer without
the lump sum part.
 As the equilibrium tax-rate is higher in the rich region than in the poor
region, the compensation transfer is positive in the rich region and negative in
the poor one.
3.1 The tax-rate incentive
One can ask if a compensation transfer causes the tax-rate to rise.
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The answer is yes. We noted (section 2.2.2) in the case of the
equalization transfer that the term which determines the tax-rates to rise is
±
-
a
d
n
s s
y2 1 2, which is the only term which appears in the compensating
transfer.
3.2 The choice on the introduction of the transfer
After having found second stage equilibrium tax-rates which are the
same as in the equalization case if substituted in the revenue functions of the
two regions we get:
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The revenue function of 1, which must give back to region 2 a part of
the collected revenue, raises with b less than in the equalization case if we set
a=b. In the compensation case there is not the positive term due to the
difference in consumption demands between the two regions. Region 2’s
revenue rises more than in the equalization case for a=b, b cause the lump-
sum part of its equalization transfer is negative. With the compensation
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transfer the rich region takes the incentive effect on all its own tax-base.
Before it transferred some of this effect to the other region.
If we subtract from  (18) and (19) the revenue without the transfer we get
that region 2 gains kaa -ny2  and region 1 gains kaa -ny1  from the
introduction of the compensation transfer.
The reason of this difference in gain with the equalization case is that in
the compensation case region 2 will not share the higher revenue it will get
from the introduction of the compensation mechanism.
Region 1 in this case can be decisive in the introduction of the
compensation transfer because it has a lower efficiency gain than region 2
has. This was not the case with the equalization system. Comparing the
equalization levels with the compensation levels it is straightforward to state:
Proposition 2: When when kk =  is so large that ny1>k  the compensation
transfer cannot be implemented unanimously. Moreover it can be possible
that an equalization transfer can still be implemented if [ ]kkk ~,Î where
n
yy
2
~ 21 +=k .
This is because a compensation transfer implies that the poor region who
accepts to introduce the transfer will gain from low harmful tax-competition
proportionally to its tax-base. With the equalization transfer the efficiency
gain is equalized.
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It is interesting to highlight that the higher the difference in tax-base, the
larger the k-range which allows the implementation of an equalizing transfer
when the regions do not agree on a compensation transfer: n
yy
2
~ 12 -=-kk .
4. Conclusions
In the paper we deal with a fiscal competition model with residents'
mobility. Regions maximise their revenue by choosing tax-rates. Equilibrium
tax-rates are lower than the efficient ones, because each region does not take
into account that the other region can benefit in revenue terms from its
decision (fiscal externality).
Introducing an equalizing transfer stimulates regions to raise tax-rates.
In the model the only source of a change in revenue is tax-base mobility. Per-
capita demands are in fact rigid. As consumers are uniformly distributed in
each region the tax-base elasticity in the poor region is higher than it is in the
rich region. The poor region’s consumers have in fact a consumption demand
lower than the rich region’s consumers. The higher the rich region’s tax-rate,
the higher the difference in demands and the lower the transport cost. We
show how the equalization transfer can be split in two components: one due
to the difference in residents’tax-bases and a transfer, which gives back the
migrated tax-base. This second component tries to offset the mobility effects:
too-low tax-rates.
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We analyse the determinants which drive the decision to introduce  an
equalization and compensation transfer.
A compensation transfer is equivalent to an equalization transfer
without the r distributive component due to the difference in tax-bases. We
show that it is possible to implement an equalization transfer when it is not
possible to implement a compensation transfer. In both cases the introduction
of the transfer induces a raise in tax-rates because of the compensation
element. In the compensation case this efficiency gain is distributed
proportionally to the residents’ tax base, in the equalization case the
efficiency gain is equalized along the two regions. The compensation transfer
could not be implemented because it could not be convenient for the region
with lower tax-base. It would not gain enough to offset the costs due to the
implementation of the transfer. With the equalization transfer the efficiency
gain of this region will raise.
This result allows to think that an equalization transfer can be used to
raise the welfare (in our case the revenue) of both regions when a
compensation transfer, which is typically used to avoid inefficiencies due to
mobility, can not.  It interesting to note that the Cockfield White paper and
subsequent Commission proposals recommended with the decision to abolish
internal fiscal frontier the introduction of a VAT clearing house mechanism
(compensation system) based on a complex information flow among the
States. Member states failed to agree on the VAT mechanism proposed by the
Commision.
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There is now a new proposal for the implementation of the VAT origin
principle which was presented by the Commission in 1996. The Commission
proposes a clearing mechanism based on estimates of aggregate trade flows
among the member states. More than one member state opposed to the
introduction of this kind of mechanism. They appear unpersuaded that
estimated trade flows would be accurate enough to achieve a fair allocation of
revenue. The States have an expected loss in revenue with the introduction of
the clearing mechanism, which according to our model can be more relevant
for states with a lower tax base. May be it could be possible for some member
states with a lower tax base than others to more easily find an agreement on
an equalizing transfer than on a compensation transfer, like the one proposed
by the Commission. So an introduction of a general transfer system based on
difference in revenue derived from VAT taxes could have an equalizing
function, but could also bring a Pareto improvement.
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Appendix
A1 Procedure to find best reply functions
Region 1 revenue:
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First order conditions:
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We proceed in three steps:
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1st step
from (3A):
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2nd step
We find revenue functions of region 1, given 2s :
Substitute (5A) in (1A):
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substitute (6A) in (2A):
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3rd step
We determine the best reply function on all the s2 r nge:
[ ]s2 £ + +min ,d a dl a  
( ) ( )R R s sp p1 1 2
2
2
2
2 2
0# - = - - - + ³a
l
a dl
d l
  
indeed in this sub-range:
( )adl ++= 22 2
1
ss ;
[ ]s2³ + +max ,d a dl a  
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indeed in this sub-range:
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The best reply function of region 1 is:
l £ 1
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A2. Proof of proposition 1
Take l £ 1. Assume s s1 2> . Region 2 tax-rate will satisfy this condition if
s1 > +
d
l
a . In this case:
s s2 1
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and region 1 has the following best reply function:
( )s s1 2
1
2
= + +d a       (8A)
if we substitute (7A) into (8A):
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indeed the equilibrium will not exist.
Take s s1 2< . If we combine best reply functions we have equilibrium tax-
rates of proposition 1. From best reply functions we know that the
equilibrium will exist if and only if:
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As:
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(a) is true.
As l £ 1 also (b) is true.
Moreover  s s1 2
* *=  is the equilibrium if and only if l = 1
QED
